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The urban/rural divide is pervasive in policy-making in Nebraska. In this nonpartisan
state, coalitions based on spatial identity or whether the legislator is urban or rural seem
to have greater weight than party especially in the creation of economic development
policy. Often, economic development policies include locational considerations which
give areas such as rural areas and economically distressed areas greater weight when
distributing program funds. In my study, I investigate whether constituency or party has a
greater impact on the legislative behavior of Nebraska state legislators when voting on
economic development and environmental legislation. I expect that constituency would
have a greater impact on the voting of rural legislators due to their shared rural spatial
identity between rural legislators and their constituents. I hypothesize that influence of
constituency will be greater because party ties in Nebraska are weak due to the expected
non-partisan nature of the Nebraska Unicameral. To test the impact of party and
constituency, I conduct an analysis of final reading roll call votes from the 2011-2012
legislative session. I find that neither party nor constituency have much impact on the
voting behavior of legislators. Further study will be needed to understand the factors that
are organizing voting in the Unicameral. Lack of party or spatial ties can pose serious
implications for economic development planning.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

In Nebraska, one of the most salient policy problems which has many
implications from an economic development planning perspective is rural sustainability.
This multifaceted issue highlights the need for policies that are sensitive to rural areas.
Concerning rural sustainability, “Brain Drain” or “human capital flight” is a serious
threat facing many rural communities.1 The flight of graduating students out of the rural
areas poses many serious economic problems. First, the amount of investment in our
state’s public education system is not returned. Second, when students leave and fail to
return, there are fewer people left to support and run existing businesses. Third, new
business will be less likely to locate in the rural areas and in the state as a whole because
of the lack of skilled workers.2 Because of these potential issues, alleviating human
capital flight has become a top priority for Nebraska’s Department of Economic
Development (DED).
In 2009-2010, in response to these concerns, the Nebraska Department of
Economic Development in conjunction with the Nebraska Department of Labor
sponsored the Growing Jobs, Industries, and Talent, A Competitive Advantage
Assessment and Strategy for Nebraska, also known as “The Battelle Study,” by the
Battelle Technology Partnership Practice. The “Battelle Study” evaluated the
Department’s overall economic development strategy. The findings of the study lead to a
legislative initiative called the Talent and Innovation Initiative or TI². The TI² initiative
was a group of legislation that sought to revamp the state’s economic development
strategy. The programs that were created by the legislation focus on human capital
development and fostering technological innovation. The legislation led to the following
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new programs: Economic Gardening, Site and Building Development Fund, Internship
Nebraska (InternNE), the Angel Investment and Tax Credit Program, and several
programs under the Business Innovation Act such as microenterprise assistance and
startup assistance.
While the TI² initiative shows a new focus for Nebraska, the initiative also
demonstrates an existing trend in Nebraska politics where Nebraska’s rural areas are
given priority. For instance, in the Economic Gardening legislation, the only eligible
businesses are those in communities and/or counties with less than 50,000 residents.
These provisions are not new to economic development legislation and policy in
Nebraska. By including such provisions, the state hopes to level the playing field between
rural and urban areas of the state. Nebraska is somewhat unique in this aspect. Most
states with similar programs do not use locational requirements to allocate funds. The
presence of the locational criteria possibly indicates the impact of spatial identity on
policy making.
Policies in Nebraska show evidence of an urban/rural divide in state politics. This
divide is nothing new and many states have similar phenomena. The divide can be
attributed to differences in social and political culture going back to the beginning of the
state. The difference in political culture between urban and rural geographic
constituencies is important because it can influence how policy makers view economic
policy. Each constituency based on its identity will have differing views on how to
distribute tax money to encourage economic growth. These views are due to how each
constituency views “the market place” and “economic rationality” as ordering principles
for society (Elazar quoted in Boeckelman, 1991). Rural agricultural constituencies may
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favor the elimination of estate and inheritance taxes, and they will view business
incentives to urban manufactures suspiciously (Young, 2011). Furthermore, policy
makers will prioritize the interests of constituency because of the absence of strong
parties. They will rely on the constituents due to the need to be reelected. Due to these
issues, one begs the question of whether political parties or the spatial identity of the
geographic constituency, are more important when legislators are voting on economic
development policy, in Nebraska. The exploration of voting behavior can provide a better
sense of what is driving certain senators to choose certain policies. Basically, are their
decisions colored by the social, cultural, and economic difference of being rural or urban
or are their decisions partisan driven.
In my thesis, I analyze the impact of the shared rural spatial identity between
constituency and rural legislators on roll call votes on economic development legislation
for the 2011-2012 legislative session, in the Nebraska Unicameral. The study is important
for a number of reasons. First, the study provides a greater understanding of the
urban/rural spatial divide, which impacts the implementation of economic development
policy in Nebraska. One-size fits all strategies and traditional economic development
strategies will not work well everywhere in the state, and they may further deepen
cleavages between urban and rural. Understanding the character of urban and rural areas
will help ensure success when implementing policies and programs. If these two areas
are culturally, socially, and economically distinct, then planners should use tools such as
cooperative planning in order to secure buy-in by communities and businesses.
Second, by exploring the link between rural spatial identity and policy-making,
economic developers, planners and policy-makers can have a better knowledge of the
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factors that affect a state’s choice of strategy. Understanding the effects of spatial identity
can have implications on why some economic development strategies work better than
others, especially what types of industries that the state should focus on, and how human
capital and the workforce can be developed.
Last, the study addresses whether political parties are necessary for democracy at
the state level. Without the presence of strong political parties for voters to identify with,
to set policy agenda and to dictate policy response, it is possible that economic
development policy may lack consistency and direction. Thus, the lack of a strong policy
direction will limit the ability of the state to achieve its economic objectives.

5

Chapter 2

Review of the Relevant Literature

When voting on legislation specifically economic development legislation, do
rural legislators act on behalf of their parties or their constituencies? I argue that rural
legislators will act primarily on the interests of their constituencies. They will act on the
interests of their constituencies because they share a distinct rural spatial identity. Smith
(2002) originally used the term, rural spatial identity, to describe the distinct spatial
identity of rural residents based on the cultural, functional and relational aspects of rural
society. I intended to expand and further develop this concept.
Factors Influencing Legislative Representation
According to Hannah Pitkin (1967), representation can fall into two main
categories: direct and substantive. Under direct representation, the legislator represents
his or her constituency directly. For example, direct representation could be a female
legislator representing her female constituents. Substantive representation is a where the
legislator represents the aggregate interests of his or her constituents regardless of factors
such as race/ethnicity or gender. Often times, legislators will act according to a mixture
of both (Orey et al., 2006).
Many factors can influence the representation and decision-making of a legislator.
Legislators may represent and make decisions based on party (Wright &Schaffner, 2002),
ideology (Poole & Rosenthal, 1997), gender (Bratton & Haynie, 1999; Orey et al., 2006),
race/ethnicity (Bratton & Haynie, 1999; Orey et al., 2006), interest groups (Nownes,
1999), media (Herbst, 1998), constituency (Seligman et al., 1974; Smith, 2002) and even
their own self-interests (Mayhew, 1974; Krehbiel, 1993). These factors which influence
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representation will have major impacts on the legislator’s voting behavior. However, the
main factor that I will investigate is constituency and its spatial identity.
Constituents
Constituency is one of most influential factors influencing representation and
decision-making. For instance Smith (2001 & 2002), finds that state legislator roll call
votes are more likely to reflect constituency interests than party interests. Constituencies
are multi-faceted and are rarely homogenous. While the constituency is made of the
population of the legislator’s home district, it can also include other external actors
(Fenno, 1978). Though, while a constituency can be made up of followers of different
political parties, most members of the constituency such as the population of the home
district share place in common. Thus, the constituency may share a common spatial
identity such as being urban, suburban or rural. In return, this identity shapes the
representation and the decision-making of the legislator.
Furthermore, legislators need to reflect the interests of their constituents because
they need to maintain or increase their share of the vote in the next election. For the
purposes of my study, I will use Fenno’s (1978) definition of geographic constituency,
which is the “the legally bound space” a legislator represents (p. 393). The geographic
constituency is constituency at its most basic level. The constituency has a unique spatial
identity which is made up of shared political culture, values, and attachment to place. For
instance, the constituency can be agrarian vs. industrial, conservative vs. liberal, and
urban vs. rural.3
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The Urban-Rural Spatial Divide
Nebraska’s political history demonstrates a clear urban-rural divide. Scholars
such as V.O. Key (1949), who studied the urban-rural divide in the South, find that the
differences in rural and urban population leads to differing political perspectives. For
instance, rural populations tend to vote against legislative term limits because term limits
disadvantage rural areas which have smaller populations, therefore a smaller pool of
eligible candidates, and they do not support some animal protection measures (Smith,
2002). Other important issues that show a divide between urban and rural include
eradication of estate and inheritance taxes. Rural legislators are against them because of
their impact on family farms and ranches (Young, 2012). In Nebraska, rural senators of
the Unicameral often question the distribution of economic development funds in the
state. They argue that economic development funds especially those in the form of tax
incentives tend to favor businesses in larger cities and the Lincoln-Omaha Metro area
(Young, 2011).
The urban-rural divide is especially troubling considering that many rural areas
have declining populations, which has affected the state and national policy environment.
Jaher (1988) finds that rural interests despite some gains are losing ground in the national
policy environment. First, the United States is becoming less rural. With fewer residents,
rural districts as well as rural legislators are disappearing. Without representation, rural
issues are not brought to the forefront in the federal policy making agenda. Furthermore,
Jaher (1988) finds that rural congressmen behave differently than urban congressmen
(p. 1079). When analyzing voting records, rural legislators are more conservative.
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Smith (2002) sees that rural populations and thus rural legislators have a “distinct
spatial identity from urban populations” (p. 2). In his study, he analyzed public policy
issues along an urban-rural spatial dimension. By doing so, one can see why some state
legislatures pass counter-majoritarian legislation, such as overturning legislative term
limits, which counter the outcomes of direct democracy through voter referendums and
initiatives. To explain why these legislatures do this, he finds that rural legislators have a
strong connection to their constituencies. The connection is strong enough for them to
override the political will of voters throughout the state. This connection between rural
legislators and their constituents is rooted in their shared rural spatial identity.
To understand why rural populations have a distinct spatial identity, he looks to
rural sociology. In his review of the rural sociology literature, he finds three major areas
of thought concerning rural identity. First, rural residents have distinct preferences based
on the cultural patterns of rurality. Second, rural spatial identity is due to the functional
aspect of rurality. Those living in rural areas have different ecological, sectoral or
occupational roles than those in urban areas. Finally, he looks at the relational aspects of
rurality. Rural societies due to the sparseness of population develop social networks over
large distances. Neighbors who may be quite far apart must build strong networks with
each other to overcome the challenges of living in sometimes isolated areas. When
looking at these theories, he concluded that rural populations in the United States have a
distinct spatial identity.
This distinct spatial identity informs the population. They choose representatives
that represent them and their issues. In some cases, the legislator’s spatial identity may
outweigh other factors when making decisions and introducing legislation. While several
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scholars have analyzed the divide between urban and rural and its effect on overall policy
at the state level (Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993), national level (Lewis-Beck, 1977)
and on popular support for ballot measures (Smith, 2001 & 2002), few scholars have
analyzed the divide’s effect on state economic development policy. When these authors
analyze political culture, they ignore variations in political culture within the state. It is
possible that urban and rural areas within the state differ greatly in this respect.
Constituency, Political Cultural and State Economic Development
Since political culture is an aspect of spatial identity, it can inform a constituent’s
and a legislator’s views on economic development. According to Hanson (1991),
“cultural orientations toward development inform basic strategies for stimulating
economic growth, rather than specific decisions about assisting particular industries or
influential business concerns” (p. 64). Elazar (1970 & 1984), developed a widely used
and critiqued typology of state political cultures. States could be identified as being
moralistic, individualistic, traditionalistic or a combination of more than one. These
political cultures each have different views of role of government in society. For
example, moralistic political cultures view government as responsible for promoting the
public good through citizen participation. In individualistic political cultures, policy
reflects the interests of those who win political competition. Traditionalistic political
cultures see that society is hierarchical which dampens political participation. Policies are
enacted to maintain the existing status quo. These political cultures are based on the
culture and norms of society within the state.
Hanson (1991) looks at the relationship between political culture and economic
development. By drawing upon Elazar’s political culture typologies, Hanson suggests
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that moralistic, individualistic and traditionalistic political subcultures entail different
economic development strategies. For instance, he finds empirical evidence that
moralistic states will seek strategies that will promote job creation for low-income
individuals. Individualistic states will employ policies that confer particularistic benefits
on investors such as tax incentives. Furthermore, traditionalistic states prefer
exclusionary incentives that tend to reinforce existing patterns of domination. His article
focuses on the macro rather than micro level of policy. For example, Hanson looks at
overall development strategy for the state rather than specific legislation or programs, and
he doesn’t distinguish between political culture variations within a state.
Additionally, Boeckelman (1991) analyzes the impact of political culture on state
development policy. Through regression analysis, Boeckelman (1991) found that
traditionalistic states favor maintenance or attraction strategies because these strategies
seek to build profitable alliances between businesses and politicians rather than long-term
economic growth. While moralistic states favor job creation strategies, which focus on
serving the common good and seek long-term gains. Also, he observes that policy
diffusion or whether neighboring states have adopted similar policies is influential on
policy-making.
Furthermore, Boeckelman (1991) argues that political culture is pertinent to
economic development issues for two reasons. First, the concept of political culture is
partly rooted in orientations toward the political economy. It is rooted in the “historical
opposition of two views of the American political system as being designed for
individuals either to bargain over self-interests (a ‘marketplace’) or to cooperate to
achieve shared goals rooted in moral principles (a ‘commonwealth’)” (Wirt, 1991, p. 4).
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Second, political culture appears to reveal itself more readily in the behavior of political
leaders than general public opinion. The reliance on political culture appears strongest
when policies are complex such as an economic development policy and when public and
private leaders play key roles (Boeckelman, 1991, p. 51). According to Boekelman
(1991), political culture “seems to act as a filter” to the state’s economic development
policy response (p. 59).
Like Hanson (1991), Boeckelman’s (1991) analysis is at the state policy level, and
both authors use multivariate analysis. Both analyses leave unanswered questions. First,
how does political culture of a constituency or even the broader encompassing notion of
rural spatial identity, which accounts for place based differences in political culture,
influence decisions on individual pieces of legislation? Second, how does all of this
translate into policy and decision-making in Nebraska, the United States’ only one house
state legislature?
Overall, legislators will be influenced by the rural spatial identity which they
share with their constituents especially when voting on economic development policy.
According to Hanson (1991), “policies to promote growth raise fundamental questions
about the aspirations of a society and the role of government in realizing the goals of its
citizens. To the extent that policy makers are socialized into their state’s prevailing
culture, they will view development in terms that are consistent with underlying values,
and pursue an appropriate strategy” (p. 64).
Rural versus Urban Interest Economic Development Legislation
One may think that due to the differences between rural and urban, that rural
residents and policy-makers would have different economic development interests. It is
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easy to assume that rural areas are more interested in policies focused on empowering
agriculture. However, identifying distinct policy differences can be very difficult. There
is not a lot of research that tackles rural or urban interest economic development policy.
A common theme from literature is that rural residents prefer inside economic
development strategies where they have greater control over the process.
Inside economic development strategies tend to favor development in small rural
communities. For instance, funding for start-ups and innovation are important in
communities lacking a large manufacturing plant. With advances in technology
specifically broadband internet, businesses can start-up virtually anywhere. New
strategies also focus on human capital and talent development. Many businesses in rural
areas are experiencing skilled worker shortages. While these strategies also benefit urban
areas, the impact is greater in the rural areas were resources are more limited. Urban
economic development policies tend to focus on business attraction and recruitment
which can be considered outside economic development strategies. In addition, for rural
residents and policy-makers, economic development and environmental protection are at
odds, especially since many rural residents depend on natural resources whether in
mining, farming, ranching, and even tourism to earn their livings.
For the purposes of this thesis, economic development legislation or legislation
which consists of policies to promote job creation and quality of life will be seen through
two lenses: rural interest and urban interest. Rural interest and progressive economic
development legislation is legislation which promotes rural economic development
interests such as inside economic development strategies. These strategies seek to
promote the growth of small business and entrepreneurs and focus on training, education,
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infrastructure and policies that promote the agricultural economy. Urban interest
economic development legislation will be more along the lines of outside economic
development strategies such as business recruitment.
Why not Parties?
Since 1937, Nebraska has had a nonpartisan unicameral legislature. The only
house is the Senate, which consists of 49 Senators. Parties in the case of legislative
behavior will be expected to be weak. This is due to the expected non-partisan nature of
the Nebraska Unicameral legislature (Wright & Schaffner, 2002).4 However, recent
research has shown that term limits, introduced in 2006, may be strengthening
partisanship (Masket & Shor, 2011). From reviewing this literature, one could ask
whether party or constituency has a greater impact on legislative behavior in Nebraska.

14

Chapter 3

Research Design and Methods

Hypotheses
Based on prior research and understanding about political parties and spatial
identity, I believe that I will find that rural spatial identity will have a stronger
relationship than political party on voting for economic development and environmental
legislation. An analysis of environmental legislation is included to add richness to my
analysis. Since pro-environmental policy displays a strong national partisan cleavage
(Dunlap, Xiao, & McCright, 2001), I found it useful to compare the voting behavior on
economic development legislation to that of environmental legislation in Nebraska. By
doing so, one can see how much different voting for economic development policy is
from environmental policy.
H(1) Spatial identity of the geographic constituency in Nebraska will have more impact
on economic development legislation vote choice than political party due to the absence
of strong political party ties.
H(2) Spatial identity of the geographic constituency in Nebraska will have more impact
on environmental legislation vote choice than political party due to the absence of strong
political party ties.
More simply put, I expect rural spatial identity to have a greater effect than
political party on voting behavior due to the nonpartisan and therefore unstructured
nature of the Nebraska Unicameral. I expect the influence of rural spatial identity to
appear stronger when voting on economic development and environmental legislation
because rural legislators may break party lines due to their distinct views on these policy
areas. For instance, rural republican senators may behave differently than urban
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republican senators. Although the two are from the same party, spatial identity may color
the lens through which each senator views the policy area. Rural senators may favor
economic development policies that focus on providing equity financing to small
business and workforce development strategies while urban senators may favor
traditional business incentives. In the case of environmental policy, rural senators may
not be “pro environmentalists” in the traditional sense. But, they will vote differently on
environmental legislation than urban senators due to their rural spatial identity in which
the environment and the economy are closely tied. I expect these relationships will
support my hypotheses that rural spatial identity has a stronger relationship with voting
behavior of rural senators than does political party.
Theoretical Characterization

Spatial Identity of Geographic
Constituency (Rural/Urban)

Legislative Behavior
(Roll Call Vote)

Economic Development/
Environmental Policy

Political Party

Figure 3.1.Theoretical characterization of the relationships between political party, spatial
identity and legislative behavior and their impact on economic development and
environmental policy.
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Data and Methods
Data for the thesis was collected from the legislative bills and roll call voting
records for the 2011-2012 legislative session of the Nebraska Unicameral. This session
was chosen for a number of reasons. First, the session had just recently finished, so the
legislation is timely and current. Second, the session produced a large number of
economic development bills compared to previous legislative sessions. With the great
number of economic development bills, it will be interesting to see how legislators
approach different types of economic development policy.
Nebraska has only one house, which is the Senate, and 49 legislative districts,
which elect one member. The legislative voting records, bill, and demographic data for
each Senator came from Nebraska State Legislature website.5 Data concerning the
demographics of each legislative district came from the United States Census.6
Legislative bills were coded according to the substantive content of the bill, for instance,
whether the bill was an economic development bill or not.
Dependent Variable
There is one dependent variable. The dependent variable is Senator vote on
economic development legislation/environmental legislation or (1=For, 0=Against). In
the first part of my analysis, which looks at voting behavior on blocks of similar
legislation, I use the overall passage rate for each category of legislation as the dependent
variable. In other words, I calculated the percentage of senators voting in support for
economic development legislation, environmental legislation and pro-environmental
legislation. In the second part of my analysis, which employs logistic regression to
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analyze the roll call votes of individual bills, I use each senator’s vote on economic
development/environmental legislation.
Independent Variables
– Party (1=Republican, 0=Other)
– Rural District (1=Rural, 0=Urban)
– Race/Ethnicity of District Pop (Percent of population that is white, nonHispanic)
– Race/Ethnicity of Senator (1=White/Non-Hispanic, 0=all others)
– Committee Chairmanship (1=Yes, 0=No)
– District Vote in ‘08 Presidential Election (Percent of district vote for
McCain in 2008 General Election)
– Gender (1=Male, 0=Female)
To measure rural spatial identity, I used the proxy measure of whether the district
is rural or not. To measure, party, I assessed whether a senator is Republican,
Independent, or Democrat. The independent and dependent variables were analyzed
through a correlation analysis and then by using logistic regression analysis. Logistic
regression was chosen due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. The
basic logistic regression model is listed below:
Vote (For or Against ED Policy/Environmental Policy) = a + (-)b1(Party)
+ (-)b2(Rural) + (-)b3(Race/Ethnicity of District) + (-)b4(Race/Ethnicity of Senator)
+ (-)b5(Vote ’08 Pres. Election) + (-)b6(Committee Chairmanship) + (-)b7(Gender)
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Chapter 4

Analysis

During the 2011-2012 session, there were a total of 51 senators. For each roll call
vote, a maximum of 49 senators voted. The fiftieth and fifty-first senators replaced two
previous senators. Senator Dennis Utter (District 33) from Hastings, Nebraska passed
away, and was replaced by Les Seiler. Another, Senator Dave Pankonin (District 2),
resigned for personal reasons. He was replaced by Paul Lambert. In addition, several
senators were absent for numerous votes due medical complications. For instance,
Senator Wightman (District 36) was absent for a length of time due to illness. Other
noticeable absences may be explained by schedule conflicts or political strategy. Not
voting on legislation was a way to take a neutral stance on controversial legislation. By
not “voting against” a bill, the senator could vote against a bill without going on record as
doing so. Future research on why some senators chose to abstain or chose to be absent
during final reading votes would be interesting and useful.
District Characteristics
The legislators represented 49 districts of which 16 were rural as defined by the
United States Census and 33 were urban.7 The differences between urban and rural
districts were quite noticeable. According to Table 4.1, urban districts were on average
younger, more racially and ethnically diverse, and had higher proportions of college
graduates. Rural districts had lower unemployment rates but also lower per capita
incomes. Looking at Maps 4.1 and 4.2, which show the location of the 49 Nebraska
legislative districts in 2000, the urban districts were clustered in the eastern one-third of
the state in the Omaha and Lincoln metro areas while the rural districts made-up the
western two-thirds of the state. Maps 4.3 and 4.4 show the districts by political party.
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Map 4.1: Legislative Districts by Spatial Identity Statewide View

Map 4.2: Legislative Districts by Spatial Identity Detail View
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Map 4.3: Legislative Districts by Party: Statewide View

Map 4.4: Legislative Districts by Party: Detail View
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Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics of Nebraska Legislative Districts
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Rural Districts
(N=16)
Median Age
Proportion H.S. Diploma (%)
Proportion Some College (%)
Proportion BA (%)
Per Capita Income ($)
Per White (%)
Unemployment Rate (%)
PerMcCain08 (%)

36.2
32.9
20.9
10.7
$20,635
84.9
2.1
58.6

46.0
42.3
25.5
17.3
$26,613
99.4
6.3
81.0

42.3
36.5
23.3
14.0
$23,097
95.8
3.9
69.8

2.8
2.9
1.5
2.3
$2,132
4.5
1.1
6.9

Urban Districts
(N=33)
Median Age
Proportion H.S. Diploma (%)
Proportion Some College (%)
Proportion BA (%)
Per Capita Income ($)
Per White (%)
Unemployment Rate (%)
PerMcCain08 (%)

23.3
16.1
17.7
7.3
$12,445
25.2
2.9
7.6

40.8
37.9
28.3
35.5
$40,149
97.5
18.5
73.2

34.2
27.13
23.9
20.2
$25,505
86.9
5.9
53.1

3.8
6.5
2.7
8.0
$6,808
13.8
3.0
14.6

Total State
(N=49)
Median Age
Proportion H.S. Diploma (%)
Proportion Some College (%)
Proportion BA (%)
Per Capita Income ($)
Per White (%)
Unemployment Rate (%)
PerMcCain08 (%)

23.3
16.1
17.7
7.3
$12,445
25.2
2.1
7.6

46
42.3
28.3
35.5
$40,149
99.4
18.5
81.0

36.9
30.2
23.7
18.2
$24,719
89.8
5.3
58.5

5.2
7.1
2.3
7.3
$5,798
12.3
2.7
14.8

Also, rural districts were more likely to vote for McCain in the 2008 General
Election. In some rural legislative districts, up to 70% of voters voted for McCain
compared to only 53% of voters in urban districts. The legislative district descriptive
statistics, in Table 4.1, show that Nebraska’s urban and rural districts are quite different
demographically, economically, and politically. The data support the literature
concerning the composition of urban and rural places (Gimple & Karnes, 2006).
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Legislative Characteristics
In the 2011-2012 legislative session, the 51 senators were predominately
Republican, white, and male. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 provide an overview of the make-up of
the Unicameral. In addition, most of the senators represented urban districts. Democrats,
with 15 members, made up 29.4% of the total, Republicans, with 35 members, made up
68.6% of the unicameral, and there was one Independent. Overall, 66.7% of senators
were from urban districts and 33.3% were from rural districts. When looking at party and
spatial identity, there was a greater share of rural Republicans versus rural Democrats.
Rural Republicans held roughly 23.5% of seats compared to the 9.8% of seats held by
rural Democrats. On the whole, the Republican Party was more heavily represented by
rural senators than by urban senators. According to Map 4.1, the urban districts fall
mainly within the Omaha and Lincoln metro areas and along the I-80 corridor.
Table 4.2
Political Party and Spatial Identity of the Senators in the 2011-2012 Legislative Session
Senate Members
Rural Democrats
Urban Democrats
Rural Republicans
Urban Republicans
Urban Independent
Grand Total

Total
5
10
12
23
1

%
9.8
19.6
23.5
45.1
2.0

51

100.0
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Table 4.3
Gender and Race of the Senators in the 2011-2012 Legislative Session
Senate Members
White Male Democrats
White Female Democrats
African American Female Democrats
White Male Republicans
White Female Republicans
White Male Independent
Grand Total

Total
10
3
2
31
4
1

%
19.6
5.9
3.9
60.8
7.8
2.0

51

100.0

Legislation
For the 2011-2012 legislative session, I identified 1,233 bills of which 525 made
it to final reading. For this thesis, I only analyzed bills that made it to final reading.
According to the rules of the Unicameral, a final reading bill is a bill that has made it
through committee and floor debates and which has been advanced to final reading. If a
bill passes final reading, then it can be signed into law or vetoed by the governor. The
bills that fail to reach final reading are either indefinitely postponed or withdrawn. Below
in a Table 4.4, the outcomes of the final reading bills are shown. About one third of the
bills passed with an Emergency Clause (“E” Clause), which become law immediately
upon being signed into law.
Table 4.4
Final Reading Bill Outcomes of the 2011-2012 Legislative Session

Number of Final
Reading Bills (525)

Failed

Passed (“E” Clause)8

Outcome
Approved by Gov.

Vetoed by Gov.

Veto Override

1

524 (151)

514

10

7

For my analysis, I considered all final reading bills regardless of their outcome.
The bills I was most interested in were those that were primarily economic development
or environmental bills. Bills were coded one (1) if they fell into one these categories.
Bills were coded zero (0) if they were not economic development or environmental bills.
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I defined economic development bills as those that involve specific economic
development strategies or policies such as increasing the amount of tax credits available
for data centers or enacting programs such as economic gardening. Also, economic
development bills included those that were sponsored by or dealt with the Nebraska
Department of Economic Development.
While there were many bills that were indirectly related to economic development
such as bills that sought changes to city sales taxes or bills concerning education or
transportation, only bills that were directly tied to economic development were
considered. Environmental legislation was included because for rural residents, the
economy and the environment are closely linked. In addition, by analyzing the voting
patterns on environmental legislation, one might have a greater understanding of the
impact of spatial identity on voting because rural legislators may view the environment
differently than urban legislators.
Overview of Economic Development and Environmental Legislation During the
2011-2012 Unicameral
Overall, 34 economic development bills reached final reading. The content of
these bills varied. For instance, a number of economic development bills dealt with new
programs to be implemented by the Nebraska Department of Economic Development.
These bills were supported by the department, political leaders, and the business
community. The legislation was focused on moving Nebraska’s economic development
strategy from traditional business attraction and recruitment to policies that sought to
incorporate greater workforce and talent development. These bills included LB345, the
Small Business Innovation Act, and LB386, the creation of Internship Nebraska. These
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might be considered to be more beneficial to rural economic development interests
because of their focus on small businesses, entrepreneurship and talent retention. Despite
some progressive changes in economic development strategy, the package of bills
included traditional tax incentives for businesses. For example, LB1080 and LB1118
sought tax credits for data centers.
Politically, most of the economic development bills were viewed favorably by
politicians, businesses, and the public. However, some rural interest groups and political
leaders raised concerns that these new programs would still disproportionately benefit
urban areas despite the increased effort to adopt more rural friendly policies. From
reading news reports and commentary, a clear Republican/Democrat or urban/rural
division was not apparent. Of all of the economic development bills which entered final
reading, all passed.
Environmental bills were more varied in their content and their support.
Considering that the Keystone XL Pipeline controversy was playing in the background,
environmental legislation during the session was a hot topic. The environmental bills
tended to pit rural and urban and Republican and Democratic interests against each other
in nuanced and unexpected ways. Overall, there were 49 environmental legislative bills,
all were passed. Of the 49 environmental bills, 14 were pro-environmental bills.
Patterns of Support for Economic Development and Environmental Legislation
To place the voting on economic development and environmental legislation into
context, it is useful to understand the patterns of voting on all final reading legislation. In
all, there were 525 roll call votes on final reading legislation. It should be noted that only
one final reading bill out of the 525 failed to pass a roll call vote. When analyzing all of
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the votes, Republicans were more likely to vote favorably on all of the bills. The
Republican passage rate for all of the legislation was 95.21%. Democratic senators
viewed the legislation on the whole less favorably. The passage rate for Democratic
senator for all legislation was only 90.53%. The lone Independent voted for all legislation
82% of the time. The average rate of passage for all senators regardless of political party
was 91.88%. It makes sense that Republicans would vote more favorably than
Democrats, since the Unicameral was composed mostly of Republicans and Republicans
introduced legislation at a greater rate than Democrats.
Impact of Party on Voting for Economic Development Legislation
First, I analyzed the impact of party on voting for economic development
legislation. After analyzing this impact, I analyzed the impact of spatial identity or
whether the senator is rural or urban on voting for economic development legislation. I
wanted to see if party or spatial identity had a greater impact or if spatial identity has an
intervening impact on party when voting for economic development legislation.
In the session, there were 34 final reading economic development bills. In Table
4.5, the votes for economic development legislation when disaggregated by party did not
show much variation. Democrats voted for economic development bills at a rate of
95.27% and Republicans at a rate of 96.33%. The lone independent was more
conservative by only voting for economic development legislation 79% of the time.
Overall, economic development legislation passed at a rate of 93.76%. Surprisingly,
Democratic senators were only slightly less likely to support the legislation than
Republican senators. I found this to be surprising because Democrats have been found to
be less supportive of traditional economic development policies such as tax incentives.
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Table 4.5
Economic Development Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Partisanship (X)
Party Identifications (X)

Percent Votes for All ED Legislation (Y)

Democrat

95.27%
(15)
79.00%
(1)
96.33%
(33)

Independent
Republican

Overall Passage Rate (All Senators)

93.76%
(49)

Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.

While the rate of passage for economic development bills was fairly close for
Democrats and Republicans with Republican senators only 1.06% more likely to pass
economic development bills, the difference between the voting pattern between urban and
rural senators was much larger as seen in Table 4.6. For instance, when voting for
economic development legislation, the rate of passage for urban senators was 94.31% as
compared to 87.53% for rural senators. This is a difference of almost 7%.
Table 4.6
Economic Development Passage Rate (Y) by Spatial Identity (X)
Spatial Identity (X)
Urban

Percent Votes for All ED Legislation (Y)
94.31%
(33)
87.53%
(16)

Rural

Overall Passage Rate (All Senators)

93.76%
(49)

Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.

This finding supports my hypothesis that urban and rural legislators have different
views on economic development policies. This could be due to the urban/rural divide
where rural senators view that economic development policy tends to favor urban areas
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over rural ones. Or, that state economic development initiatives favor business
recruitment and attraction in urban areas over strategies that favor rural communities such
as talent and entrepreneurship. In Table 4.7, after controlling for spatial identity or
whether the senator was urban or rural, urban Democrats passed economic development
legislation 94.40% of the time which is comparable to the passage rate for urban
Republicans which was 94.27%. Between rural Democratic and rural Republican
senators, the difference is much clearer. Rural Democrats were more supportive of
economic development legislation than rural Republicans.
Table 4.7
Economic Development Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Partisanship (X) controlling for
Spatial Identity (Z)

Party Identification (X)
Democrat

Urban

Spatial Identity (Z)
Rural

All Senators

94.40%
(10)
79.00%
(1)
94.27%
(22)

97.00%
(5)
0.00%
(0)
92.27%
(11)

95.27%
(15)
79.00%
(1)
96.33%
(33)

94.31%
(33)
Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.

87.53%
(16)

93.76%
(49)

Independent
Republican

All Senators

The finding that rural Democrats were the most supportive of all of the groups is
surprising and contrary to my hypotheses. I expected both rural Democrats and
Republican senators to be less supportive of economic development legislation due to
their unique spatial identity.
Next, I evaluated the voting patterns with a more rigorous statistical test to see if
there were any other factors that could be impacting legislative behavior. Furthermore, I
wanted to know how statistically significant the relationships were between party, spatial
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identity, and support for economic development legislation. The variables that I included
in the analysis were the political ideology of the senator’s home district as measured by
the percent of voters voting for United States Senator John McCain, the Republican
presidential candidate, in the 2008 General Election, whether the senator was a
committee chair, the race/ethnicity of the senator, and the gender of the senator, and
whether the senator was a rural Republican.
First, I analyzed the correlation between the three variables: party, which was
coded one (1) for Republican and zero (0) for Democrat, rural spatial identity which was
coded one (1) for a rural legislative district and zero (0) for an urban legislative district,
and voting behavior on economic development legislation which is the percent rate of
passage for economic development legislation. I performed the analysis of correlation
using Statistica statistical software.
According to Table 4.8, my first analysis of the correlation between political party
and rate of passage for economic development legislation was negative and not
statistically significant at the .10 level. The correlation was weak and not in the expected
direction. I expected Republican senators to be more favorable of economic development
legislation than Democratic senators. The relationship between spatial identity and voting
for economic development legislation was also negative, very weak and not statistically
significant. Although not significant, the relationship was in the expected direction. I
expected rural senators to be less favorable of economic development legislation than
urban senators.
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Table 4.8
Correlations: Roll Call Votes, Party, Spatial Identity
Republican Senator

Rural District

Percentage of votes For Economic Development
Legislation

-.213

-.117

Republican Senator

1.000

.091

Rural District

.091

1.000

Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01

Next, I analyzed the interaction between party and spatial identity on voting
behavior. I coded rural Republicans as one (1) and all others as zero (0). Table 4.9 shows
the relationship between the interaction variable (rural Republican) and voting behavior
was negative and not statistically significant. The combined interaction between political
party and spatial identity was slightly stronger than the relationship between spatial
identity and legislative behavior alone.9
Table 4.9
Correlations: Roll Call Votes, Party, Spatial Identity
Republican
Senator

Rural District

Rural Republican
Senator

Percentage of votes For Economic
Development Legislation

-.213

-.117

-.198

Republican Senator

1.000

.091

.375**

Rural District

.091

1.000

.784**

Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01
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Except for rural Democrats, rural Republicans were less favorable of economic
development legislation than urban Republicans and urban Democrats. Party had a
slightly stronger impact on voting behavior than spatial identity. When political party and
spatial identity were combined the coefficient was slightly weaker.
Table 4.10 shows other variables which may have some impact on voting
behavior include political ideology of the home district, the race/ethnicity of the
legislator, whether the senator is a committee chair, and gender. When running the
analysis, these variables were found to have very weak relationships with voting
behavior. Furthermore, these relationships were not significant at the .05 or .10 levels.
Table 4.10
Correlations Roll Call Votes, Party, Spatial Identity

Percentage of votes For
Economic Development
Legislation

Political ID
of District
(Percentage
for McCain
in 2008
General
Election)

Percent
of White
Residents in
District

Committee
chair

Male

Race/Ethnicity
of Senator

-.095

-.078

-.0134

-.160

-.013

Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01

Environmental Legislation
The findings concerning the voting behavior of urban and rural Democrats and
Republicans were very weak and not significant, but the findings shed some support for
the hypothesis that spatial identity combined with party has an impact on voting on
economic development legislation. But, does this finding holds true for environmental
legislation. According to the literature, economic development and environmental policy
is very closely linked for rural policy makers because the rural economy is tied with the
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environment. At the party level, Republicans and Democrats have distinct views on
environmental legislation, especially pro-environmental legislation. Republicans tend to
favor fewer restrictions and regulations than Democrats. The difference between
Republicans and Democrats on environmental legislation gets muddier when spatial
identity is involved. For instance, the literature finds that rural residents may be more
favorable to some types of environmental legislation especially legislation that protects
farmland, that upholds water rights, and that limits restrictions on wild animal control.
Rural residents can be pro-environment but in a different way than urban residents. Thus,
rural Democrats would vote differently than urban Democrats, and the same would be
true for rural and urban Republicans.
First, looking at party and voting behavior, in Table 4.11, Democrats were less
likely to vote for environmental legislation than Republicans.
Table 4.11
Environmental Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Partisanship (X)
Party Identifications (X)
Democrat
Independent
Republican

Overall Passage Rate (All Senators)

Percent Votes for Environmental Legislation (Y)
91.73%
(15)
88.00%
(1)
94.30%
(33)
91.29%
(49)

Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.

The Republican passage rate was 94.30% compared to 91.73% for Democrats. The
content of the environmental legislation may contribute to the lower level of support from
Democrats. For instance, while there was some pro-environmental legislation much of
the legislation sought to decrease regulation of the environment. Some of the bills were
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not necessarily anti-environmental but not necessarily pro-environmental in the
traditional sense either. While dealing with the environment, the bills did not reflect the
priorities of national pro-environmental groups such as Green Peace or the Sierra Club. 10
In Tables 4.12 and 4.13, rural senators were less supportive of environmental legislation
than urban senators.
Table 4.12
Environmental Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Spatial Identity (X)
Spatial Identity (X)

Percent Votes for Environmental Legislation (Y)

Urban

91.25%
(33)
86.29%
(16)

Rural

Overall Passage Rate (All Senators)

91.29%
(49)

Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.
Table 4.13
Environmental Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Partisanship (X) controlling for Spatial Identity (Z)

Party Identification (X)

Urban

Spatial Identity (Z)
Rural

All Senators

Democrat

90.60%
(10)
88.00%
(1)
91.5%
(22)

93.80%
(5)
0.00%
(0)
91.27%
(11)

91.73%
(15)
88.00%
(1)
94.30%
(33)

91.25%
(33)
Note. Numbers of Senators are in parentheses.

86.29%
(16)

91.29%
(49)

Independent
Republican

All Senators

Pro-Environmental Legislation
Focusing only on traditionally pro-environmental legislation, then the pattern
becomes much clearer. Fourteen of the 49 environmental bills were pro-environmental
bills. Table 4.14 shows that the Democratic passage rate for pro-environmental
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legislation was 85.27%. Republican support was much lower at 78.16%. Even though the
Democrats were more favorable of pro-environmental legislation, they were not
overwhelmingly so.
Table 4.14
Pro- Environmental Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Partisanship (X)
Party Identifications (X)

Percent Votes for Pro-Environmental Legislation (Y)

Democrat

85.27%
(15)
85.71%
(1)
78.16%
(33)

Independent
Republican

Overall Passage Rate (All Senators)

80.39%
(49)

Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.

Spatial identity or whether the senator was urban or rural did not seem to matter. The
passage rates for both groups were very similar in Table 4.15. 11
Table 4.15
Pro- Environmental Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Spatial Identity (X)
Spatial Identity (X)
Urban

Percent Votes for Pro-Environmental Legislation (Y)
80.46%
(33)
80.25%
(16)

Rural

Overall Passage Rate (All Senators)

80.39%
(49)

Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.

I expected that Democrats would be the most favorable of pro-environmental
legislation than Republicans. In addition, I expected rural legislators to be less supportive
of pro-environmental legislation than urban legislators. Furthermore, of all of the groups I
expected urban Democrats to be the most supportive and rural Republicans to be the least
supportive of traditional pro-environmental legislation. However, Table 4.16 shows that
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while urban Democrats were supportive of pro-environmental legislation, rural
Democrats were much more supportive. Urban and rural Republicans were the least
supportive. This finding makes sense in that urban and rural residents view
environmental protection in different ways.
Table 4.16
Pro- Environmental Legislation Passage Rate (Y) by Partisanship (X) controlling for Spatial Identity (Z)

Urban

Spatial Identity (Z)
Rural

All Senators

83.12%
(10)
85.71%
(1)
79.19%
(22)

90.00%
(5)
0.00%
(0)
76.19%
(11)

85.27%
(15)
85.71%
(1)
78.16%
(33)

80.46%
(33)
Note. Numbers of senators are in parentheses.

80.25%
(16)

80.39%
(49)

Party Identification (X)
Democrat
Independent
Republican

All Senators

Overall, the rural Democrats were the most favorable of pro-environmental legislation
while the rural Republicans were the least supportive.
Correlation
I once again used a correlational analysis to analyze the relationship between
voting, political party and spatial identity. Table 4.17 shows that the correlation
coefficient for voting for pro-environmental legislation and political party was weak and
negative in direction. The coefficient is not statistically significant at the p<.10 level. The
relationship was in the expected direction, since I expected that Republicans would be
less likely to vote for pro-environmental legislation than Democrats. Though the
correlation coefficient is weak, it is slightly stronger than the correlation between
political party and voting for all environmental legislation bills, which may demonstrate
some impact of the type of legislation on voting behavior.
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The correlation coefficient between voting for pro-environmental legislation and
spatial identity was very weak, negative, and not statistically significant as shown in
Table 4.17. In the case of voting for pro-environmental legislation, political party had a
stronger relationship with the decision to vote for pro-environmental legislation than
spatial identity.
Table 4.17
Pro-Environmental Roll Call Votes, Party, and Spatial Identity
Republican Senator

Rural District

-.164

-.074

-.206

-.007

Republican Senator

1.000

.091

Rural District

.091

1.000

Percentage of votes For Environmental
Legislation
Percentage of votes For Pro-Environmental
Legislation

Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01

Independently, political party had some impact on roll call voting in the
Unicameral. When political party and spatial identity were combined, the relationship
between the combined variable and voting for pro-environmental legislation was negative
and weaker than for party alone but stronger than for spatial identity alone as shown in
Table 4.18. The coefficient was not statistically significant at the p<.10 level. This
finding did not support my hypothesis of spatial identity having a greater impact on
voting behavior than political party; however, it was interesting that spatial identity or
being from a rural district may temper Republican partisanship on roll call voting on proenvironmental legislation.
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Table 4.18
Pro-Environmental Roll Call Votes, Party, and Spatial Identity Interaction Variable (Rural Republican
Senator)
Republican
Senator

Rural District

Rural Republican
Senator

-.164

-.074

-.156

-.206

-.007

-.154

Republican Senator

1.000

.091

.375**

Rural District

.091

1.000

.784**

Percentage of votes For
Environmental Legislation
Percentage of votes For ProEnvironmental Legislation

Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01

Next, I included some other independent variables in the analysis such as a
political identification of the district, the racial/ethnic composition of the district, whether
the senator was a committee chair, gender, and the race/ethnicity of the senator. In all, the
correlation coefficients, in Table 4.19, were very weak. They ranged from -.034 to .167.
Only one was statistically significant at the p<.05 level.
Table 4.19
Correlations Roll Call Votes, and Other Independent Variables

Percentage of votes For
Environmental Legislation

Political ID
of District
(Percent
Vote for
McCain in
2008
General
Election)

Percent
of White
Residents in
District

Committee
Chair

Male

Race/Ethnic
ity of
Senator

-.034

-.074**

.080

-.132

.070

.099

.106

-.071

.167

Percentage of votes For
Pro-Environmental
.024
Legislation
Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01
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Logistic Regression
Logistic regression was used because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent
variable. For instance, each for vote was coded as one and each against vote was coded as
zero. In addition, logistic regression was chosen because of the ease of interpreting
results as odd ratios. I chose to analyze six economic development roll call votes and
seven environmental roll call votes. These votes were chosen because of their saliency.
To determine saliency, I reviewed news articles and interest group websites, to which
bills were prominent.
Economic Development Roll Call Votes
First, I ran six logistic regression models of economic development roll call votes.
Once again the dependent variable was a senator’s vote on the bill. The six bills that were
included in the analysis were LB345 or the Business Innovation Act, LB386 or the
Internship Nebraska Act, LB388 or the site and building development fund, LB1053 or
the act to create an independent Nebraska tourism agency, and LB1080 and LB1118
which set up tax credits for data centers. Table 4.20 provides the title and voting results
for these six bills.
LB345, LB386, and LB1053 are economic development bills were more
favorable to rural interests. These bills included programs that were different than
traditional economic development programs. The Business Innovation Act (LB345)
provided funding to a suite of programs that focused on encouraging entrepreneurship
and the creation of small businesses through programs such as economic gardening and
microenterprise assistance. Internship Nebraska (LB386) proposed to fund college
internships in hopes that students would be hired and stay in the rural areas. LB1053
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proposed to create an independent Nebraska Tourism Department. It was seen as
favorable to rural interests since tourism is important to the rural economy. LB1080 and
LB1118 were two traditional economic development bills and were seen as counter to
rural interests since data centers were more likely to locate in urbanized areas. Table 20
provides a brief overview of the six bills.
Table 4.20
Key Economic Development Roll Call Votes
Bill

Title

Rural
Interest
Yes

For

Against

47

2

Not
Voting
0

LB345

Adopt the Small Business Innovation Act

LB386

Provide job training grants for interns

Yes

43

0

6

LB388

Adopt the Site and Building Development
Act and change provisions relating to the
Affordable Housing Trust Fund

No

46

0

3

LB1053

Create Nebraska Tourism Commission and
transfer powers and duties from the Travel
and Tourism Division of the Department of
Economic Development

Yes

47

0

2

LB1080

Provide a property tax exemption and a
sales and use tax exemption relating to
data centers

No

44

2

3

LB1118

Provide tax incentives for large data center
projects

No

48

0

1

The independent variables included in the analysis were Republican senator
(1=yes, 0=no), Rural senator (1=yes, 0=no), male senator (1=yes,0=no), white nonHispanic senator (1=yes, 0=no), committee chair (1=yes,0=no), the percentage of voters
for McCain in 2008 in the district, and the percentage of whites in the district. The
analysis generated some interesting findings; however, none of the findings were
significant at the .05 or .10 level. A summary of the logistic regression analysis for the
six roll call votes is below in Table 4.21.
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Table 4.21
Odds Ratios of Voting for Economic Development Legislation
LB345

LB386

LB388

LB1053

LB1080

LB1118

Odds Ratio
p value

Odds Ratio
p value

Odds Ratio
p value

Odds Ratio
p value

Odds Ratio
p value

Odds Ratio
p value

__

__

__

__

.535
p=.699

__

__

__

__

__

.332
p=.542

__

__

__

__

__

5.009
p=.412

__

__

.567
p=.663

__

__

__

__

__

__

__

__

__

__

__

3.610
p=.199

__

3.156
p=.378

.598
p=.580

__

.029
p =.617

204.557
p=.292

__

__

7.986
p=.676

24.172
p=.685

__

__

__

__

7.101
p=.394

__

Republican Senator

Rural Senator

Rural Republican Senator

Male Senator

White non-Hispanic Senator

Committee Chair

Percentage Vote for McCain
in 2008 General Election

Percent White in District

Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01

The two independent variables that standout when looking at the odds ratios for
each of the roll call votes in Table 4.21 are committee chairmanship and the percentage
of votes for McCain in 2008 in the home district. Committee chairs were 3.6 times more
likely to vote for LB386 and LB1053, and forty percent less likely to vote for LB1080.
The percent of votes for McCain in 2008 was an important factor in four of the six roll
call votes. For LB245 or the Business Innovation Act, senators from districts with heavy
support for McCain in 2008 were 204 times more likely to vote for LB386. Those
senators were about eight times more likely to vote for LB1080 and twenty-four times
more likely to vote for LB1118.
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Environmental Roll Call Votes
Concerning environmental legislation in Table 4.22, I examined seven roll call
votes. The roll call votes examined were for the following: LB229, LB283, LB329,
LB473, LB629, LB845, and LB1161. LB283 and LB629 were pro-environmental bills.
LB629 and LB1161 dealt indirectly with the Keystone XL Pipeline. LB473 was a highly
controversial anti-environmental bill that would allow farmers and ranchers greater
control to deal with the wild prairie dog population. Another controversial bill with antienvironmental tones was LB229 which sought to cut funding from the Nebraska
Environmental Trust Fund. Table 4.22 shows the title and voting outcomes of the seven
roll call votes.
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Table 4.22
Key Environmental Roll Call Votes
Bill

Title

ProEnvironmental
No

Rural
Interest
No

For

Against

39

5

Not
Voting
5

LB229

Change and eliminate
provisions relating to the Water
Resources Cash Fund and the
Nebraska Environmental Trust
Fund and provide an additional
consideration for grants from
the Nebraska Environmental
Trust Fund

LB283

Change provisions relating to
property tax levy limits and
provide school boards with tax
levy and bond authority
relating to energy efficiency
projects

Yes

No

27

19

3

LB329

Update the International
Energy Conservation Code and
change Nebraska Energy Code
provisions

Yes

No

44

0

5

LB473

Adopt the Black-Tailed Prairie
Dog Management Act

No

Yes

32

11

6

LB629

Adopt the Oil Pipeline
Reclamation Act

Yes

Yes

47

0

2

LB845

Provide reclamation
requirements under the Oil
Pipeline Reclamation Act

Yes

Yes

46

0

3

LB1161

Change provisions relating to
oil pipelines and provide for an
evaluation of routes

Yes

Yes

44

5

0

When analyzing the environmental roll call votes, in Table 4.23, the factors of
party, gender, committee chairmanship, and home district party ideology appear
prominent. Once again, caution must be used because none of the findings were
significant at the .05 or .10 level. Republican senators were about seventy percent less
likely to vote against LB329, about 3.6 time more likely to vote for LB473, and 9.3 times
more likely to vote for LB1161. Male senators were about two times more likely to vote
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for LB329, LB473, and LB1161. Committee chairs were 2.3 times more likely to vote for
LB229, 2.7 times more likely to vote for LB473 and LB629, and 6.5 times more likely to
vote for LB1161 They were less likely to vote for LB283 and LB329. Senators from
districts that voted primarily for McCain in 2008 were 817 times more likely to vote for
LB229, almost 490 times more likely to vote for LB629 and 20.5 times more likely to
vote for LB473. Interestingly, rural senators were about 8.8 times more likely to vote for
LB1161, but when spatial identity and political party were combined, rural Republicans
were about seventy-five percent less likely to vote for LB1161.
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Table 4.23
Odds Ratios of Voting for Environmental Legislation
LB229
Odds
Ratio
p value

LB283
Odds
Ratio
p value

LB329
Odds
Ratio
p value

LB473
Odds
Ratio
p value

LB629
Odds
Ratio
p value

LB845
Odds
Ratio
p value

LB1161
Odds
Ratio
p value

__

__

.339
p=.598

3.696
p=.253

__

__

9.353
p=.162

__

__

__

__

__

__

8.809
p=.301

__

__

__

__

__

__

.235
p=.518

__

__

2.350
p=.423

2.121
p=.405

__

__

1.734
p=.636

__

__

__

__

__

__

__

2.343
p=.333

.343
p=.212

.270
p=.423

2.717
p=.185

2.612
p=.529

__

6.552
p=.116

817.660
p=.155

__

__

20.545
p=.453

490.128
p=.396

.055
p=.631

__

__

__

__

__

__

__

__

Republican Senator

Rural Senator

Rural Republican Senator

Male Senator

White non-Hispanic Senator

Committee Chair

Percentage Vote for McCain
in 2008 General Election

Percent White in District

Note. *p<.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01
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Chapter 5

Discussion and Conclusion

Discussion
While there is no statistically significant pattern to the voting behavior of the
senators in the Unicameral, it appears that party rather than spatial identity is the more
important factor when looking at roll call votes in blocks of related legislation. When
looking at individual bills, the political identity of the home district and
experience/leadership as measured by committee chairmanship becomes more important.
Senators are only loosely tied to their party and are weakly tied to their
constituency. They reflect the interests of their constituents more through political
identity rather than spatial identity. However, this relationship is very weak. The lack of
consistent and clear voting patterns supports Welch (1978). In her chapter “The Impact of
Party on Voting Behavior in the Nebraska Legislature,” she finds that the Nebraska
unicameral has many coalitions with many only consisting of one member. She expected
that if the unicameral were structured upon party lines than all Democrats would vote
together and all Republicans would vote together. She finds that “neither party nor any
other group serves as a potential organizing influence in the legislature; these findings
indicate that in general, party has minimal influence on voting of legislators” (“The
Impact of Party”, p. 106). My findings counter those of Masket & Shor (2011) who found
evidence that the Nebraska unicameral was becoming more politically polarized. The
unicameral might be becoming more politically polarized but not on economic
development and environmental policy.
I expected to find support for hypothesis that rural legislators would vote on
behalf of constituency more so than party during roll call votes on economic development
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legislation. They would choose to represent constituency because rural legislators share a
unique rural spatial identity with their geographic constituency. My expectation was that
senators would be direct representatives where the people of the district chose a senator
whose social and economic background mirrored their own. Under this model of
representation, the senator’s actions should reflect the interests of the constituents.
However, I found greater evidence of trustee or substantive representation where the
senator votes according to his or her own judgment rather than the opinions of the
district.
In Nebraska, I expect a shift in economic development policy is underway. With
advances in technology, rural areas no longer have to depend on agribusiness. For
example, with the advent of high speed internet, software developers are no longer tied to
urban areas. The only limitation is the availability of broadband infrastructure. Rural
areas can benefit from changing economic development strategy from traditional business
attraction incentives to programs that foster innovation, entrepreneurship, and asset
modernization.
If it’s Not Party or Spatial Identity then what is Influencing Voting?
In the absence of political party and spatial identity, legislators may be responding
to their own personal interests or to interest groups. For instance, scholars have found that
in the absence of party, recruitment of candidates is driven by self-interest and private
interest groups. These interest groups may include chambers of commerce, banking and
finance groups, and farmers’ interest groups among others. Furthermore, interest groups
in a nonpartisan environment are heavily relied upon for their expertise (Kolasa, 1978).
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As found in Masket & Shor (2011), the governor may be exerting influence over
roll call voting. Due to nonpartisanship, there is a weak leadership structure in the
Unicameral. Leadership on the floor is limited to committee chairs and the speaker.
Though, according to Johnson (1978), leadership in the Unicameral is more
administrative and procedural rather than political. The Governor is really the only
formal political leader. Masket & Shor (2011) found that with the advent of term limits,
the influence of the governor as a policy initiator has grown considerably.
Research Limitations and Potential for Future Study
The research faced several limitations. For instance, due to the small sample size,
there was not enough variation in the data. In the 2011-2012 session, there were 525 final
reading bills of which only one failed to pass. In addition, most of the bills passed by
more than 90 percent. An analysis of legislative behavior earlier in the legislative process
would be more rewarding. For instance, Bothun et al. (1978) and Berens (2005) see that
committees act as a de facto second house. It is in committees where most of the hard
work of debating and refining the bill takes place. If the bill does not make it through
committee, then it is either indefinitely postponed or defeated. A bill that emerges
successfully from committee is likely to be automatically sent to final reading. Most final
reading bills pass because they have already been vetted and agreed upon by all parties in
the committee.
Comparing the legislative behavior of the 2011-2012 session with past sessions
and other state legislatures, may help overcome some of the limitations of this study.
One factor that was not included was term limits. Only studying the policy areas of
economic development and the environment was another limitation. Other policy areas
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such as education, appropriations, and health and human services may have shown a
more politicized legislature. Future research should include a comparison of several
policy areas. According to Bothun et al. (1978), the top committees are the ones that
spend a lot. These ones are the most desired assignments. The top committees are
Appropriations, Education, and Agriculture. For Nebraska legislators, these policy areas
may be more divisive.
In addition, the results of this study question the definition of urban and rural. For
instance, a senator from a rural district may not be from the rural part of the district. He
or she may live in town and thus have a more urban spatial identity. Another possible
classification is identifying senators as from metro and non-metro districts. A previous
analysis conducted on behalf of this study attempted to classify senators in this manner;
however, appropriately coding legislators according to metro and non-metro residency
was problematic. The large size of the legislative districts which encompass several
counties do not conform well to the U. S. Census defined metropolitan statistical areas.
GIS software should be used for more in-depth spatial analysis of the composition of
rural, urban, non-metro, and metro regions of legislative districts. Furthermore, future
study should look more closely at the occupations of the senators and where they live
within their districts. Without doing so, it would be difficult to capture substantive
representation. Plus, qualitative data gathered from interviews of the senators on their
beliefs and views would make it easier to understand how senators represent their
constituents.
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Implications
The findings of the study will have numerous implications, especially in the fields
of Economic Development, and Community and Regional Planning.
Economic Development Implications
Nonpartisanship makes it difficult to change the status quo; however, term limits
may speed the process up. Before term limits, there was a lack of turnover in the
Unicameral. The nonpartisan nature of elections made it is easier for incumbents to be
reelected due to greater voter familiarity. One positive that came from a lack of turnover
was that senators tended to be more experienced. However, without any political parties
to organize opposition of candidates and policies, senators were able to take more
moderate positions. Lack of competition in elections also meant that there was a lack of
diversity of political views among candidates. Thus, changing the direction of economic
development policy in Nebraska may be very cumbersome. According to Bothun et al.
(1978), the highly decentralized pattern of policy initiation makes it hard to break the
status quo (p. 75). The impact of term limits which were enacted in 2000 may have made
it possible for the Talent and Innovation legislation including the Business Innovation
Act and Internship Nebraska to pass. Senators who were not favorable to the Nebraska
Department of Economic Development were termed out in the elections prior to the
beginning of the 2011-2012 session. Lack of flexibility and slow response to change may
impair Nebraska’s ability to compete nationally and globally and tackle such problems as
human capital retention.
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Community and Regional Planning
The nonpartisan nature of the unicameral could be problematic for the field of
community and regional planning. Nonpartisan elections may impede the election of
progressive candidates who may advocate for planning friendly policies. For instance,
“nonpartisan elections decrease the influence of Democrats in urban politics, and more
significantly, foster conservative policies unresponsive to demands for social change or
for the use of government to remedy social problems” (Comer & Johnson, 1978, p. 4).
Adherence to the status quo would make it difficult for Nebraska to enact policies that
promote smart growth and sustainability. The absence of party loyalties can be both a
negative and a positive. For example, lack of party ties make building coalitions difficult
and once built, hard to maintain. Unstable coalitions could lead to policy that is
shortsighted and unclear. On the other hand, without having to adhere to a strict party
platform, legislators may be freer to vote at will. Thus, this autonomy gives progressive
legislation a greater chance in a conservative legislative body.
Lack of clear rural or urban coalitions with in the Unicameral may lead to policy
that does not adequately reflect the economic development interests of either group. Lack
of a strong policy focus may lead to programs and planning efforts that are difficult to
successfully implement. The literature on economic development planning finds that
some policies work better in some areas of the state than in others. The difference in
success can vary considerably between neighboring communities (Ramsay, 2013) For
instance, political culture and spatial identity can help economic developers and planners
understand why rural residents may be for or against certain types of development. Rural
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residents may prefer projects that support small business ownership versus the location of
large manufacturing plant.
Conclusion
In conclusion, these findings may be useful for understating the impact of rural
spatial identity on legislative behavior and policy-making in other states. Although
Nebraska is unique because of its unicameral legislature, the impact of rural and urban
divisions is not. In addition, the study adds to the literature by clarifying the impacts of
constituency and political party on policy-making at the state level. Exploring the factors
that affect decision-making shed light on why states chose certain economic development
policies. The nonpartisan unicameral was supposed to give the people more power
through better representation. My findings show that while the vision of Senator George
Norris has remained true in the sense that the Nebraska Unicameral is largely
nonpartisan, the lack of organization along party or geographic lines may have serious
implications on progressive economic development and pro-environmental policy. Future
research is needed to understand the true impact of an unstructured legislature in specific
policy areas beyond economic development and the environment such as education and
health and welfare.
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Endnotes

Brain Drain or human capital flight is the “migration of people endowed with a high
level of human capital” (Beine et al., 2001). See also: Carr, J. and M. Kefalas. 2009. Hollowing
Out the Middle: The Rural Brain Drain and What it Means for America. Boston: Beacon.
1

2

The movement of individuals and businesses to locations which maximize profit and
utility is a key aspect of Location Theory. Individuals and firms will act on their own self-interest.
According to Jaher (1988), “‘Urban’ districts have 50% or more of their population
residing in central cities of metropolitan areas. ‘Suburban’ districts are those where half or more
of the population resides outside central cities of metropolitan areas. A ‘mixed’ district cannot be
clearly classified as urban or suburban. ‘Rural’ districts are those where half or more of the
population resides outside metropolitan areas” (p. 1078).
3

4

Due to the fact that Nebraska has a one house legislature, many studies remove
Nebraska from their analyses.
5

http://uniweb.legislature.ne.gov/index.php

6

http://www.census.gov/

7

Rural areas are defined as areas with a population of less than 2,500. Areas of at least
2,500 but less than 50,000 are classified as Urban Clusters. Areas of 50,000 or more are classified
as Urbanized Areas according to the United States’ Census Bureau on
http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/urban-rural.html.
8

Emergency Clause (“E” Clause) is “a provision that allows a bill or a portion of a bill
take effect immediately after the governor signs it or after the Legislature overrides the
governor’s veto.” From http://uniweb.legislature.ne.gov/about/glossary.php

